About
I am an economics PhD candidate at Johns Hopkins University, with research interests in political economy and development economics. I use causal inference to study how authoritarian political institutions, bureaucratic incentives, and historical legacies shape governance and individual behavior in China.
You can find my CV here.
Research
This paper studies how government control of the judiciary affects political accountability under an authoritarian political system. I propose a model where local governments choose the amount of action taken against citizens, which are litigable in courts controlled either by local governments themselves or higher-level governments. The model predicts that, as a result of centralizing judicial control, courts become stricter towards local governments, but only when the interests of local and higher-level governments diverge. Instability decreases and local fiscal revenue falls when courts are stricter, but the amount of governmental action increases because local governments double down to make up for the lost revenue. Empirically, using a judicial centralization reform in China, I validate the predictions of the model by showing that centralization made local governments more likely to lose in administrative lawsuits, but the effect becomes negligible for cases with high political sensitivity where the interests of local and provincial governments align. The number of labor protests fell, local governments' discretionary fiscal revenue decreased, but the amount of land requisition increased. These results illustrate the limits of top-down accountability without the rule of law.
This paper investigates the effect of early-life experience of mass political violence on political participation and attitudes in China. Using geographical and cohort variation of exposure to political violence during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), we find that exposure to violence reduced political participation several decades later in the 2010s: it made people less likely to vote in local elections, pursue political action in response to government mistreatment, or join the Chinese Communist Party. The adverse effect is stronger when the political action in question entails a greater degree of political participation, and is weaker in places with high social capital. We also show that experiencing political violence heightened oppositional attitudes towards the Communist regime. Together, these results document a "chilling effect" of political violence: whereas experiencing mass political violence makes people more skeptical of the Chinese government, it discourages engagement in political action.
Corruption often happens in the form of collusion within government. Stronger enforcement, however, could increase collusion within government, making anti-corruption purges backfire. This paper presents a game-theoretic model in which higher punishment in an anti-corruption purge results in a counterintuitive increase in collusion. This is because higher punishment during a purge raises the "stakes of the game", resulting in more collusion to curry favors and build connections that are helpful for survival. We provide empirical evidence for this in a case study of China's anti-corruption campaign since 2012, where most governmental collusion happens alongside alcohol banquets. We find an increase in alcohol consumption of Chinese public sector employees, relative to private sector ones, after the start of the anti-corruption campaign. We present evidence that the political mechanism from the model is behind the increase in drinking: the increase is almost entirely driven by baijiu, the most politically important drink in China. The effect on drinking is also more pronounced among junior, male, and urban employees.
We study the properties of mass anti-corruption campaigns. To do so, we use a formal model of top-down accountability in which an autocrat faces a mass of agents who can be honest or corrupt and loyal or disloyal (two-dimensional type). Agents can embezzle funds for private gains and exert effort on individual projects. The autocrat values good performance and loses from agents' embezzlement. We show that when the autocrat can easily detect corrupt activities, so that no agent ever embezzles during the campaign, a mass purge always increases the proportion of corrupt agents within the system. Indeed, we highlight how an anti-corruption campaign spills over into an ideological mass purge. We discuss how our findings help to re-interpret anti-corruption efforts in autocracies, including Xi Jinping's recent purge of the Chinese Communist Party.
Teaching
- Intermediate Microeconomics, Johns Hopkins University, Fall 2026
(Teaching Assistant to Prof. Branden Daley) - Intermediate Microeconomics, Johns Hopkins University, Spring 2026
(Teaching Assistant to Prof. Branden Daley and Prof. Edi Karni) - Intermediate Microeconomics, Johns Hopkins University, Fall 2025
(Teaching Assistant to Prof. Sohani Fatehin) - Market Design, Johns Hopkins University, Spring 2025
(Teaching Assistant to Prof. Maria Betto) - Elements of Microeconomics, Johns Hopkins University, Fall 2024
(Teaching Assistant to Prof. Muhammad Husain) - Development Economics, Peking University, Fall 2019
(Teaching Assistant to Prof. Jingyi Ye)
Media & Public Writing
In addition to my academic research, I write extensively on U.S. politics and economy for Chinese-language media outlets such as Initium, Caixin, ThePaper.cn, and Jiemian News. I am also a regular contributor to The American Roulette (美轮美换), a Chinese-language podcast offering in-depth discussions of U.S. politics.
